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I. INTRODUCTION
Health care providers believe their liability insurance premiums are
too high because the judicial system is out of control. "The largely indis-
criminate nature of the system-where anyone can file a lawsuit for any
reason regardless of whether there is evidence that negligence oc-
curred-has engendered a fear of liability in physicians that is harmful to
individual patients and to the health care system as a whole."' Providers
claim that because of high insurance premiums, physicians are retiring
early, relocating to states with lower insurance rates, avoiding high-risk
practice areas, and practicing defensive medicine by ordering unneces-
sary tests and limiting high-risk, perhaps necessary, procedures. 2 This
situation has led both doctors and lawyers to declare that there is a "mal-
practice insurance crisis in the United States today."
3
This crisis, or the claim that one exists, is not new. "Physicians
have contended that since the early- to mid-nineteenth century there has
been a medical malpractice crisis pitting physicians against injured pa-
tients and their attorneys.'A The debate over how to respond to this crisis
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1. Donald J. Palmisano, Case Study, Health Care in Crisis: The Need for Medical Liability
Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 371, 374 (2005).
2. Juan Carlos B. Gomez, Commentary, Silencing The Hired Guns: Ensuring Honesty in Medi-
cal Expert Testimony Through State Legislation, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 385, 385 (2005); see also Kathe-
rine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Defensive Medicine and Disappearing Doctors?, REGULATION,
Fall 2005, at 24.
3. Richard E. Anderson, Case Study, Effective Legal Reform and the Malpractice Insurance
Crisis, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 341, 343 (2005); see also Gomez, supra note 2, at
385.
4. Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Wis. 2005).
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is not limited to physicians, their patients, and the attorneys representing
them, however. Rather, it is a national debate among doctors, lawyers,
Congress, state legislatures, and our judiciary about how to respond to
calls for change.5
Health care providers and insurance companies are asking legisla-
tures to limit damages awards to victims of medical negligence. As one
court recently observed: "In the case of medical malpractice, interest
groups representing every aspect of the delivery of health care are heav-
ily involved in lobbying the legislature." 6 These lobbyists are seeking
statutory control of jury verdicts in the form of damages caps.7
The argument for damages caps is premised upon an assumption
that legislative limits will lead to lower insurance premiums, which will
in turn ensure "quality health care by creating an environment that health
care providers are likely to move into, or less likely to move out of."8
Proponents also argue that caps will prevent the practice of defensive
medicine.9 The "underlying assertion" of the call for legislation, how-
5. See Kimberly J. Frazier, Note, Arkansas's Civil Justice Reform Act of2003: Who's Cheating
Who, 57 ARK. L. REv. 651, 696 (2004); see also Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 447; Robert F. Williams,
Foreword. Tort Reform and State Constitutional Law, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 897, 900 (2001) (observing
that the "conflict over tort reform pits the plaintiffs' bar... against the defense bar").
6. Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 448.
7. Most states with damages caps limit "noneconomic" damages, although some states limit
both economic and noneconomic damages. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-1708.IF (West
Supp. 2006) (capping noneconomic damages); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220(A) (West Supp.
2005) (capping noneconomic damages); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (West Supp. 2005) (cap-
ping economic and noneconomic damages). A typical definition of noneconomic damages is as
follows:
[M]oneys intended to compensate for pain and suffering; humiliation; embarrassment;
worry; mental distress; noneconomic effects of disability including loss of enjoyment of
the normal activities, benefits and pleasures of life and loss of mental or physical health,
well-being or bodily functions; loss of consortium, society and companionship; or loss of
love and affection.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55(4)(a) (West Supp. 2005). The definition in a proposed congressional bill
is similar, defining noneconomic damages as "physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconven-
ience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society
and companionship, loss of consortium (other than loss of domestic service), hedonic damages,
injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature." Help Efficient, Acces-
sible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare Act, H.R. 534, 109th Cong. § 9(15) (2005). In contrast, a typical
definition of economic damages is as follows:
[O]bjectively verifiable monetary losses incurred as a result of the provision of, use of, or
payment for (or failure to provide, use, or pay for) health care services or medical prod-
ucts, such as past and future medical expenses, loss of past and future earnings, cost of
obtaining domestic services, loss of employment, and loss of business or employment
opportunities.
Id. § 9(6).
8. Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 487.
9. See id. at 465. "Defensive medicine" is defined as occurring "when doctors order tests,
procedures, or visits, or avoid high-risk patients or procedures, primarily.., to reduce their exposure
to malpractice liability." Id. at 487 n.230 (internal quotation omitted).
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ever, is "that the tort system is 'broke' or at least badly in need of re-
pair."
10
While this may be the call of some physicians and insurance com-
panies looking for ways to reduce the high costs of medical malpractice
insurance," there is no agreement as to the best way to control these
costs. Some commentators claim that it is "clear" that the "current prob-
lems are the result of a dramatic increase in the cost of litigation,"' 2 but
others are not so sure. 13 As discussed below, other explanations for the
high cost of malpractice insurance include insurers' poor investment de-
cisions and insurers' business decisions, such as offering low premiums
to attract new customers. 14 At the very least, the evidence is anything but
"clear," and, as one observer has stated: "The possible causes of the
medical malpractice insurance increases are always subject to debate."' 5
Despite compelling evidence that the current approach of limiting dam-
ages has not lowered malpractice premiums, however,' 6 health care pro-
viders and their insurers continue to call for legislatively-imposed dam-
ages caps, and our state and federal legislatures are responding. 17
Since 1986, more than forty-one states have passed legislation "to
limit the liability of wrongdoers, restrict the amount of monetary dam-
ages injured consumers [can] receive in court, or make it more difficult
for the injured to obtain attorneys to represent them against insurance
companies. ' ' i Limitations include damages caps for both noneconomic
and economic losses, shortened limitations periods for filing suit, and
10. Id. at 467.
1I. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 352; Melissa C. Gregory, Note, Capping Noneconomic
Damages in Medical Malpractice Suits is Not the Panacea of the "Medical Liability Crisis, " 31
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2005).
12. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 3, at 343.
13. See, e.g., Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 472; Baicker & Chandra, supra note 2, at 24; Gregory,
supra note 11, at 1034.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. Gregory, supra note 11, at 1035. A review of the current literature makes clear that the
debate is raging. Compare Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Mal-
practice Liability Actions. Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV.
417, 467 (2004) (arguing that prevailing market forces in the property/casualty insurance industry
are driving premiums up and that damage caps address only one of several factors causing the in-
creased premiums), and Gregory, supra note 11, at 1034-35 (questioning whether legislatively man-
dated caps will cure any of the problems facing health care providers), with Palmisano, supra note 1,
at 382-83 (calling for legislatures to enact medical liability reform).
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See Palmisano, supra note 1; see also W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia Bom, Medical Malprac-
tice Insurance in the Wake ofLiability Reform, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 463 (1995).
18. J. ROBERT HUNTER & JOANNE DOROSHOW, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, PREMIUM
DECEIT: THE FAILURE OF "TORT REFORM" TO CUT INSURANCE PRICES 3 (2002), http://insurance-
reform.org/PremiumDeceit.pdf.
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restrictions on where a suit may be brought.' 9 Some of these statutes
have been invalidated on constitutional grounds, but "[f]or the most part,
these new 'tort limits' have remained on the books. 2 °
Oliver Wendell Holmes once said: "The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience., 21 Logic may not, however, be so easily
separated from experience. Indeed, it is defined by experience, and
judges "apply logic and experience" when reviewing the cases before
them.22 Based on logic and experience, it is now time to revisit the issue
of how best to control medical malpractice premiums and preserve the
health of the health care industry.
This Article considers whether state damages caps are constitu-
tional and examines recent studies suggesting that damages caps are not
achieving their intended goals. Given the mounting evidence against the
effectiveness of damages caps and the questions about their constitu-
tional validity, this Article proposes moving away from legislative caps
on damages. Instead, this Article argues for a modified market model
based on a combination of improved care, which would include im-
provements in service; better peer review; and, if necessary, legislation
which would be designed to protect the confidentiality of peer review,
reduce frivolous lawsuits, and regulate insurance rate increases.
Part II examines federal and state legislative responses to the call
for damages caps. Part III addresses the constitutional issues raised by
legislatively imposed limitations on damages awards. Part IV goes be-
yond these issues to ask whether, even if damages caps pass constitu-
tional muster, these legislative limits offer any real solution to the issue
that is really at the heart of the debate: premium rate increases. Part V
proposes a solution that combines market forces and legislative controls
to regulate insurance rate increases, enhance peer review, and reduce
frivolous lawsuits.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Health care providers and insurers have turned to the legislative
branch of our federal and state governments for a solution to increasing
liability premiums, and the legislatures have responded. The U.S. House
of Representatives has passed, and several state legislatures have en-
19. See id at app. A.
20. Id. at 3.
21. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
22. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 163 (1999) (emphasis added).
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acted, various limitations on medical malpractice claims and the recovery
of damages for such claims.23
A. Federal Legislation
In January 2005, President Bush challenged Congress to limit the
manner in which a plaintiff injured by a negligent doctor can recover
damages.2 4 In response, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare Act (HEALTH
Act). The Act would limit noneconomic damages awards to $250,000,
restrict where plaintiffs may file medical malpractice suits, shorten the
limitations period in which such suits may be brought, restrict attorneys'
contingency fees, and allow the introduction of collateral-source bene-
fits. 26 The stated purpose of the HEALTH Act is "to implement reason-
able, comprehensive, and effective health care liability reforms," which
are designed to:
(1) improve the availability of health care services in cases in which
health care liability actions have been shown to be a factor in the
decreased availability of services; (2) reduce the incidence of "de-
fensive medicine" and lower the cost of health care liability insur-
ance, all of which contribute to the escalation of health care costs;
(3) ensure that persons with meritorious health care injury claims
receive fair and adequate compensation, including reasonable non-
economic damages; (4) improve the fairness and cost-effectiveness
of our current health care liability system to resolve disputes over,
and provide compensation for, health care liability by reducing un-
certainty in the amount of compensation provided to injured indi-
viduals; and (5) provide an increased sharing of information in the
23. See, e.g., Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare Act, H.R. 534, 109th
Cong. (2005) (containing venue restrictions, contingent fee limitations, collateral source rule modifi-
cations, limitations on joint and several liability, shortened statute of limitations); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 1-1708.1D(B) (West 2004) (modifying the collateral source rule); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-1
(West 2000) (shortening the statute of limitations); Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Com-
pensation Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5002 (West Supp. 2005) (establishing a no-fault approach for
obstetricians); Id. § 8.01-581.15 (limiting economic and noneconomic damages); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
538.210 (West Supp. 2006) (limiting noneconomic damages); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-
1708.IF (West Supp. 2006) (limiting noneconomic damages).
24. President George W. Bush, Address at the Gateway Center in Collinsville, Illinois, 41
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 9 (Jan. 5, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/01/20050105-4.html.
25. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare Act, H.R. 534, 109th Cong.
(2005).
26. Id. "Under the collateral source rule, benefits received by the plaintiff from a source wholly
independent of and collateral to the wrongdoer will not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable
from the wrongdoer." Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc. v. Oneok, Inc., 136 P.3d 428, 440 (Kan. 2006).
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health care system which will reduce unintended injury and improve
patient care.
The Senate is currently considering similar legislation, but has not
yet passed a bill.28 In President Bush's 2006 State of the Union address,
he renewed his request for Congress "to pass medical liability reform this
year."2 9
B. State Legislation
Many states have also enacted limitations on medical malprac-
tice damages awards. "In 2003 alone, forty-one states introduced legisla-
tion that either proposed or changed caps on noneconomic damages for
medical malpractice awards." 30 By late 2005, approximately twenty
states had enacted caps on noneconomic damages. 31 Legislation from a
few representative states is presented below by way of example only and
is not intended to be an exhaustive list of what each state has done.
Typical statutory language can be found in South Carolina's recent
enactment of a cap on noneconomic damages awarded against health
care providers.32 Noneconomic damages are limited to "an amount not to
exceed three hundred fifty thousand dollars for each claimant., 33 If
judgment is rendered against more than one health care provider, liability
for each provider is limited to "an amount not to exceed three hundred
fifty thousand dollars for each claimant, and the limit of civil liability for
noneconomic damages for all health care institutions and health care
27. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare Act, H.R. 534, 109th Cong. § 2(b)
(2005).
28. See Healthy Mothers and Healthy Babies Access to Care Act, S. 366, 109th Cong. (2005);
Pregnancy and Trauma Care Access Protection Act, S. 367, 109th Cong. (2005); Help Efficient,
Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare Act, S. 354, 109th Cong. (2005).
29. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc.
145 (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060131-
I O.html.
30. Gregory, supra note 11, at 1033.
31. See Kevin McManus, Comment, Finding a Cure for High Medical Malpractice Premiums:
The Limits of Missouri's Damage Cap and the Need for Regulation, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 895, 896,
896 n.8 (2005) (referencing Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisi-
ana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin statutes). Since that survey was completed, South Carolina has also
enacted a cap on noneconomic damages. See S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-32-200-240 (West Supp.
2005). Wisconsin's cap, however, has been invalidated on constitutional grounds. See Ferdon ex rel.
Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Wis. 2005).
32. See S. C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-210(5) (West Supp. 2005). Health care provider is defined as
"a physician, surgeon, osteopath, nurse, oral surgeon, dentist, pharmacist, chiropractor, optometrist,
podiatrist, or similar category of licensed health care provider." Id.
33. Id. § 15-32-220(A).
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providers is limited to an amount not to exceed one million fifty thou-
sand dollars for each claimant." 34 The limitations
do not apply if the jury or court determines that the defendant was
grossly negligent, willful, wanton, or reckless, and such conduct
was the proximate cause of the claimant's noneconomic damages,
or if the defendant has engaged in fraud or misrepresentation related
to the claim, or if the defendant altered or destroyed medical records
with the purpose of avoiding a claim or liability to the claimant.
35
While South Carolina's cap limits each individual claimant's re-
covery, other state statutes limit the total recovery for each negligent act,
regardless of how many claims are filed.36 Oklahoma refers to this type
of limit on total recovery as a "hard cap" because it applies "regardless
of the number of actions brought with respect to the personal injury."
37
Oklahoma has a hard cap of $300,000, which applies only if the defen-
dant has made an offer of judgment. 38 The jury may lift the cap in certain
circumstances.39
To account for inflation, state damages cap statutes may provide for
increases in the total amount of recoverable damages in a variety of
ways. For example, Oklahoma's cap may be adjusted annually "based
upon any positive increase in the Consumer Price Index that measures
the average changes in prices of goods and services purchased by urban
wage earners and clerical workers' families and single workers living
alone (CPI-W) for the preceding calendar year. '4° Virginia, which caps
34. Id. § 15-32-220(C). Missouri has a similar cap on noneconomic damages. See MO. ANN.
STAT. § 538.2 10 (West Supp. 2006).
35. S. C. CODE ANN. § 15-32-220(E) (West Supp. 2005).
36. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1708.IF-l(A) (West Supp. 2006); TEX. CIv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (a) (Vernon 2005).
37. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1F-l(A) (West Supp. 2006).
38. If an ultimate judgment is less than the amount of an offer ofjudgment previously made by
a litigant, that offer of judgment protects the litigant from having to pay certain costs incurred after
the offer is made. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1101.1 (West Supp. 2006); accord FED. R. Civ. P.
68 ("If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree
shall pay all costs accruing after the making of the offer.").
39. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1-1708. IF-I(A), (D) (West Supp. 2006). The statute provides,
in part:
If nine or more members of the jury find by clear and convincing evidence that the de-
fendant committed negligence or if nine or more members of the jury find by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the conduct of the defendant was willful or wanton, the lim-
its on noneconomic damages provided for in subsection A of this section shall not apply;
provided, however, the judge must, before submitting such determination to the jury,
make a threshold determination that there is evidence from which the jury could reasona-
bly make the findings set forth in the case.
Id. § 1-1708.1F-I(D).
40. Id. § 1-1708.1F-l(B); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483(4) (West 2006) (al-
lowing the state treasurer to "adjust the limitation on damages for noneconomic loss set forth in
2006]
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economic and noneconomic damages at $1.5 million regardless of the
number of claims, 4' accounts for inflation as follows:
The maximum recovery limit of $1.5 million shall increase on
July 1, 2000, and each July 1 thereafter by $50,000 per year;
however, the annual increase on July 1, 2007, and the annual in-
crease on July 1, 2008, shall be $75,000 per year. Each annual
increase shall apply to the act or acts of malpractice occurring on
or after the effective date of the increase. The July 1, 2008, in-
crease shall be the final annual increase.42
Texas caps noneconomic damages at $250,000 for each individual
claimant
where final judgment is rendered against a physician or health
care provider other than a health care institution ... regardless of
the number of defendant physicians or health care providers
other than a health care institution against whom the claim is as-
serted or the number of separate causes of action on which the
claim is based.43
Texas limits claims against a single health care institution to
$250,000 for each claimant."a When more than one institution is sued,
liability is capped at "$250,000 for each claimant and the limit of civil
liability for noneconomic damages for all health care institutions, inclu-
sive of all persons and entities for which vicarious liability theories may
apply, shall be limited to an amount not to exceed $500,000 for each
claimant.
4 5
subsection (1) by an amount determined by the state treasurer at the end of each calendar year to
reflect the cumulative annual percentage change in the consumer price index. As used in this subsec-
tion, 'consumer price index' means the most comprehensive index of consumer prices available for
this state from the bureau of labor statistics of the United States department of labor.").
41. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (West Supp. 2005).
42. Id.
43. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (a) (Vemon 2005).
44. Id. § 74.301(b).
45. Id. § 74.301(c). The Texas statute is silent on whether these caps will be adjusted for infla-
tion. See id. In contrast, Texas's statutory cap on damages in a wrongful death case does provide for
adjustments for inflation:
[T]he liability limit ... shall be increased or decreased, as applicable, by a sum equal to
the amount of such limit multiplied by the percentage increase or decrease in the con-
sumer price index, as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States
Department of Labor, that measures the average changes in prices of goods and services
purchased by urban wage earners and clerical workers' families and single workers living
alone (CPI-W: Seasonally Adjusted U.S. City Average-All Items), between August 29,
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It should be noted that Texas is different than most states because it
amended its constitution to allow the legislature to enact these damages
caps. 46 As discussed below, in states without such constitutional authori-
zation, courts are divided over whether these types of statutory limita-
tions are constitutional.
III. CAN LEGISLATURES CONSTITUTIONALLY
SAVE THE MEDICAL PROFESSION?
State damages caps are constitutionally suspect under both the fed-
eral and state constitutions. They have been challenged on various con-
stitutional grounds, and state courts are divided over whether the limits
are constitutional.47 A review of these state court decisions suggests that
states' legislative power to enact damages caps is anything but clear. The
differences in the outcomes can be explained, in part, by variations in
state constitutions. For example, as discussed above, Texas amended its
constitution to specifically allow its legislature to impose caps on dam-
ages. 48 In contrast, Arizona has amended its constitution to prohibit its
legislature from abrogating tort remedies. 49 These differences, however,
do not account for the inconsistent state court decisions regarding
whether damages caps are constitutional.50
The constitutional challenges discussed below fall into two catego-
ries: (1) individual rights, including the right to equal protection under
46. See TEX. CONST. art. II, § 66. To protect its statutory cap from constitutional challenge,
the Texas legislature passed House Joint Resolution 3, commonly referred to as "Proposition 12,"
which was approved by the voters. See H.R.J. Res. 3, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003). It author-
ized the legislature to set limits on noneconomic damages, and it applies to limitations in medical
malpractice liability cases as well as all other tort actions. Ruben James Reyes, Capping Your
Rights: The Texas Statute of Non-Economic Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases and its
Assault on the Rights of the Injured and the Power of the Courts, 6 SCHOLAR 347, 353 (2004).
47. See Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 448 (Wis.
2005).
48. See TEX. CONST. art. Ill, § 66; see also discussion supra note 46.
49. The Arizona constitution provides: "No law shall be enacted in this state limiting the
amount of damages to be recovered for causing the death or injury of any person." ARIZ. CONST. art.
11, § 31. It further provides: "The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abro-
gated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation." Id. art. XVIII, § 6.
Legislation imposing caps has been struck down. See, e.g., Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging,
Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 443 (Ariz. 2003) (statute abolishing right to bring action in battery against li-
censed health care provider violated anti-abrogation clause of Arizona constitution); Hunter Con-
tracting Co., Inc., v. Super. Ct., 947 P.2d 892, 899 (Ariz. 1997) (statutory requirement of an affidavit
from an expert when filing a lawsuit unconstitutionally violated fundamental right to pursue dam-
ages under Arizona constitution); Smith v. Myers, 887 P.2d 541, 548 (Ariz. 1994) (statutory periodic
payment scheme for medical malpractice actions violated plaintiffs' right to recover damages for
personal injuries or wrongful death as guaranteed by Declaration of Rights in Arizona constitution).
50. See Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 448,448 n. 12.
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the law, the right to due process of law, and the right to trial by jury, 51
and (2) separation of powers.
A. Individual Rights
1. Equal Protection: A Case Study
Many state courts have addressed the issue of whether damages
caps violate the guarantees of equal protection, due process, and the right
to a jury trial. 53 In Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Patients Com-
pensation Fund, 5 the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered a medical
malpractice victim's constitutional challenge to damages caps and pro-
vided a thorough analysis of the issues surrounding the debate. The
court's decision rested on equal protection grounds.55 However, the
court's thorough review of the practice of medicine and the empirical
data related to the impact of damages caps is instructive and may be ap-
plicable to the resolution of any individual rights constitutional challenge
to damages caps. The court relied upon empirical data spanning a period
of over ten years, including non-partisan state and federal governmental
studies, as well as studies done by private interests groups, such as the
American Trial Lawyers Association and the American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA). 56 A discussion of this case will provide a guide for analyz-
ing the issues that are at the heart of the debate. Other cases that are con-
sistent and inconsistent with Ferdon's holding will be briefly discussed
or briefly mentioned to illustrate different courts' approaches to the is-
sues.
In Ferdon, plaintiff Matthew Ferdon suffered injuries as a result of
a physician's negligence during his birth.5 7 According to evidence pro-
duced at trial and accepted by the jury, the doctor delivering Matthew
pulled on his head and caused an injury called obstetric brachial plexus
51. See infra Part III.A.
52. See infra Part III.B. Other constitutional provisions, such as open courts provisions and
uniform operation of laws provisions, have also been relied on to challenge damages caps. See, e.g.,
Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 138 (Utah 2004). The standard for determining whether these provi-
sions have been violated is similar to, or less stringent than, the standard applied in an equal protec-
tion analysis, see id at 140-42, and thus will not be separately considered here. Similarly, due proc-
ess challenges will not be separately analyzed because, as one court has noted, "the tests for whether
legislation violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses . . . are essentially the same."
Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721, 737 n.12 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
53. See, e.g., infra notes 112 & 113.
54. 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005).
55. See id. at 447.
56. See id. at 470 nn.136-50, 488 n.232.
57. Id. at 449.
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palsy.58 This injury resulted in paralysis and deformity in Matthew's
right arm. 59 By the time of trial, he had already undergone repeated sur-
geries and occupational therapy and would require more surgery and
therapy in the future; his arm would never function normally.60 Based on
these facts, the jury awarded him $403,000 for future medical and hospi-
tal expenses. 6' In addition, the jury awarded him $700,000 in non-
economic damages for past and future personal injuries, but made no
award for loss of future earning capacity.62 The jury awarded Matthew's
parents $87,600 as compensation for the personal care they would pro-
vide to Matthew until the age of 18.63 After the verdict, the court reduced
the $700,000 personal injury award to $410,322, as required by the
state's cap on noneconomic damages. 64 According to the court's compu-
tation, the statutory cap "mean[t] that Matthew Ferdon will have an
award of approximately $5,900 a year as the reasonable amount neces-
sary to compensate him for living with a partially functioning, deformed
right arm. 65
On appeal, Matthew challenged the noneconomic damages cap on
several grounds. He claimed that it violated several provisions of the
Wisconsin Constitution, including the equal protection guarantees, 66 the
right to a trial by jury,67 the right to a remedy,68 the due process clause,
and the separation of powers doctrine.70 Concluding that the cap violated
the equal protection guarantees of the state constitution, the court did not







64. Id. The cap was $350,000, which was adjusted for inflation, as required by WIS. STAT. §§
655.017 and 893.55(4)(d) (2001-2002). Id. According to the statute:
The limit on total noneconomic damages for each occurrence ... shall be $350,000 and
shall be adjusted by the director of state courts to reflect changes in the consumer price
index for all urban consumers, U.S. city average, as determined by the U.S. department of
labor, at least annually thereafter, with the adjustment limit to apply to awards subsequent
to such adjustments.
WIS. STAT. § 893.55(4)(d) (2001-2002).
65. Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 446.
66. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1.
67. Id. art. I, § 5.
68. Id. art. I, § 9.
69. Id. art. I, § 1.
70. Id. art. VII, § 2.
71. Ferdon. 701 N.W.2d. at 447.
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The court first had to decide what level of scrutiny to apply in the
equal protection analysis. 72 Matthew argued that the court should apply
strict scrutiny. 73 According to the court, strict scrutiny would require the
defendant to prove
that the $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages caused by medical
malpractice tortfeasors promotes a compelling governmental inter-
est and that the $350,000 cap is the least restrictive means for doing
so. That is, the [defendant] would have to show that the cap is pre-
cisely tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
74
The defendant, on the other hand, argued that rational basis, not strict
scrutiny, was the appropriate level of scrutiny.75
The court agreed with the defendant, noting that the damages cap
"does not deny any fundamental right and does not involve a suspect
classification. 76 This conclusion placed a heavy burden on Matthew to
prove that the statute was unconstitutional: "A person challenging a stat-
ute on equal protection grounds under the rational basis level of scrutiny
bears a heavy burden in overcoming the presumption of constitutionality
afforded statutes. 77 Respecting the role of the legislature, the court noted
that "the judiciary is not positioned to make the economic, social, and
political decisions that fall within the province of the legislature. 7 8 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that Matthew had to "demonstrate that [the]
statute [was] unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt., 79 To meet this
72. Both the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions guarantee equal protection of the law.
Frame v. Nehls, 550 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Mich. 1996). To determine whether a legislative classifica-
tion violates equal protection, the reviewing court applies one of three tests. Crego v. Coleman, 615
N.W.2d 218, 223 (Mich. 2000). Strict scrutiny applies if the legislation "impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class."
Vargo v. Sauer, 576 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Mich.1998) (citing Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 312 (1976)). See also State v. Anala, 484 N.W.2d 138, 144 (Wis. 1992) (citing Murgia,
427 U.S. at 312). An "intermediate level" of scrutiny will be applied where the classification "must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 456 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (apply-
ing intermediate scrutiny to a gender-based classification)); accord Neal v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp.,
575 N.W.2d 68, 77 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). As stated by the Michigan Court of Appeals, "social and
economic legislation is generally examined under the traditional rational basis test." Zdrojewski v.
Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).
73. Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 456.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 457.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at n.69 (quoting Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 613 N.W.2d 849,
857 (Wis. 2000)).
79. Id. at 457-58.
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burden, the challenger must show that the statute is "patently arbitrary"
with "no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.,
80
To determine the constitutionality of the damages cap under the ra-
tional basis standard, the court undertook a "thoughtful examination of
not only the legislative purpose, but also the relationship between the
legislation and the purpose." 81 Examining the legislative concerns, the
court noted that
the legislature found that malpractice lawsuits raise the cost of
medical malpractice insurance for providers. According to the legis-
lature, higher medical malpractice insurance costs, in turn, harm the
public because they result in increased medical costs for the public
and because health care providers might leave Wisconsin. The leg-
islature also found that health care providers were practicing defen-
sive medicine because of the rising number of claims and that they
might refuse to enter the Wisconsin health care market.
82
As observed by the court, the legislature sought to remedy these
concerns and enacted the damages cap in order to: (1) "Ensure adequate
compensation for victims of medical malpractice with meritorious injury
claims;" (2) "Enable health care insurers to charge lower malpractice
insurance premiums by reducing the size of medical malpractice
awards;" (3) "Reduce overall health care costs (by lowering malpractice
insurance premiums) for consumers of health care;" and (4) "Encourage
health care providers to practice in Wisconsin." 83 The court addressed
each of these objectives individually, as set forth below.
a. Ensuring Adequate Compensation for Victims
The court first considered "whether a rational relationship exists be-
tween the legislative objective of compensating victims fairly and the
classification of medical malpractice victims into two groups-those
who suffer noneconomic damages under $350,000 and those who suffer
noneconomic damages over $350,000.,,84 Analyzing this classification,
the court acknowledged that "the burden of the cap falls entirely on the
most seriously injured victims of medical malpractice. Those who suffer
the most severe injuries will not be fully compensated for their non-
80. Id. at 459 (quoting Maurin v. Hall, 682 N.W.2d 866, 890 (Wis. 2004)).
81. Id. at 460.
82. Id. at 463-64.
83. Id. at 464-65. A fifth objective, not relevant here, was the legislature's intent to protect the
state's Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund, id., which is supported by all health care
providers and was "created to pay medical malpractice claims that exceed primary insurance thresh-
olds established by statute." Id. at 451 (citing WIS. STAT. § 655.23(4)(b)(2) (2001-2002)).
84. Id. at 465.
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economic damages, while those who suffer relatively minor injuries with
lower noneconomic damages will be fully compensated."8 5 The court
also pointed out that "[y]oung people are most affected by the $350,000
cap on noneconomic damages, not only because they suffer a dispropor-
tionate share of serious injuries from medical malpractice, but also be-
cause many can expect to be affected by their injuries over a 60- or 70-
year life expectancy."
86
Starting with the presumption of constitutionality, 87 and acknowl-
edging that the "legislature enjoys wide latitude in economic regula-
tion,"88 the court nevertheless concluded that "the legislative classifica-
tion created by a $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages is arbitrary and
creates an undue hardship on a small unfortunate group of plaintiffs." 89
Accordingly, the court held that:
If the legislature's objective was to ensure that Wisconsin people in-
jured as a result of medical malpractice are compensated fairly, no
rational basis exists for treating the most seriously injured patients
of medical malpractice less favorably than those less seriously in-
jured. No rational basis exists for forcing the most severely injured
patients to provide monetary relief to health care providers and their
insurers .... We therefore conclude that a rational relationship does
not exist between the classifications of victims in the $350,000 cap
on noneconomic damages and the legislative objective of compen-
sating victims of medical malpractice fairly. 90
b. Lowering Malpractice Insurance Premiums
The court then considered whether the damages cap was rationally
related to the legislative objective of lowering malpractice insurance
premiums, noting that Wisconsin "has a legitimate interest in reasonably
priced premiums for medical malpractice insurance if the cost or delivery
of health care is threatened by escalating premiums." 9' Acknowledging
that the $350,000 cap "intuitively appears to be rationally related to the
legislative objective of lowering medical malpractice insurance costs to
ensure quality health care for the people of the state, 92 the court re
viewed empirical evidence from several studies examining the impact of
85. Id.
86. Id. at 466.
87. See id. at 457.
88. Id. at 466.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 466-67.
91. Id. at 467.
92. Id.
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damages caps, including those of the Officer of the Wisconsin Commis-
sioner of Insurance. 93 In each of its reports, the Office of the Commis-
sioner of Insurance found "[n]o direct correlation" between the damages
cap and medical malpractice premium insurance rates.94 The court noted
that "[o]ther studies support the Commissioner's finding that medical
malpractice insurance premiums are not affected by caps on non-
economic damages. 95 A review of "the available evidence from nearly
10 years of experience with caps on noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases in Wisconsin and other states ' 96 led the court to hold
that "it is not reasonable to conclude that the $350,000 cap has its in-
tended effect of reducing medical malpractice insurance premiums."
97
Thus, "the $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical malprac-
tice cases [was] not rationally related to the legislative objective of low-
ering medical malpractice insurance premiums." 98
c. Reducing Overall Health Care Costs
Next, the court questioned "whether there is a conceivable set of
facts from which the legislature could conclude that a $350,000 cap on
noneconomic damages furthers the state's interest in controlling medical
malpractice insurance costs for health care providers, thereby controlling
health care costs for the people of the state." 99 Although the court noted
that the damages cap appeared "at first blush, to be related to the legisla-
93. Id. at 470. The Office of the Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance is required by law to
report on the impact of Wisconsin's damages cap every two years. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. §
601.427(9) (2001-2002)).
94. Id. at 471 (quoting WISCONSIN OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE, REPORT ON
THE IMPACT OF 1995 WISCONSIN ACT 10 (May 12, 2005)).
95. Id. These studies included those done by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), "a
non-partisan federal government entity that is the audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Con-
gress," and the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. Id. at 471, 471 n.141. According to the court,
the results of several GAO studies indicated "that a number of factors go into whether medical mal-
practice premiums increase or decrease and that there is no definitive correlation between caps on
noneconomic damages and lower medical malpractice premium rates." Id. at 471. See also id. at 471
nn.141-58 for citations to other studies. The court discounted the value of the Wisconsin Academy
of Trial Lawyers' study, which discussed "the effects of noneconomic damage caps on premiums,
payouts and the availability of insurance coverage," because it used "only 'median' figures in draw-
ing its conclusions without providing the reader with the underlying data, averages, or even the
range that gave rise to the median figures used." Id. at 471 n.141. Because of this, the court rea-
soned, "a state that shows a median decrease in premiums may have actually had an average increase
in premiums, or vice versa. It is impossible to draw any conclusions from the data and figures ... [in
the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyer's study]." Id.
96. Id. at 474.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 483.
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tive objective of keeping overall health care costs down,"' 00 the court
ultimately concluded that "the correlation between caps on noneconomic
damages and the reduction of medical malpractice premiums or overall
health care costs is at best indirect, weak, and remote."'' Thus, the court
held, "there is no objectively reasonable basis to conclude that the
$350,000 cap justifies placing such a harsh burden on the most severely
injured medical malpractice victims, many of whom are children."'
10 2
d. Encouraging Health Care Providers to Practice in Wisconsin
Finally, the court examined the legislature's interest in attracting
and retaining health care providers. Citing the legislature's declaration
that "[t]he cost and the difficulty in obtaining insurance for health care
providers discourages and has discouraged young physicians from enter-
ing into the practice of medicine in this state,"' 0 3 the court proceeded to
examine the empirical data to determine if there was any support for this
assertion. After reviewing a number of studies,1 4 the court decided that it
could not
conclude that a $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages is rationally
related to the objective of ensuring quality health care by creating
an environment that health care providers are likely to move into, or
less likely to move out of, in Wisconsin. The available evidence in-
dicates that health care providers do not decide to practice in a par-
ticular state based on the state's cap on noneconomic damages.'
0
In connection with the state's interest in encouraging health care
providers to practice in Wisconsin, the court considered whether provid-
ers were practicing defensive medicine, thereby increasing the cost of
patient care. 0 6 Although the court acknowledged "anecdotal support for
the assertion that doctors practice defensive medicine,"'0 7 the court noted
that "[t]hree independent, non-partisan governmental agencies have
found that defensive medicine cannot be measured accurately and does
not contribute significantly to the cost of health care."' 1 8 Other studies
100. Id.
101. Id. at 485. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that "medical malpractice insurance
premiums are an exceedingly small portion of overall health care costs," id. at 483, and that "even if
the $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages would reduce medical malpractice insurance premiums,
this reduction would have no effect on a consumer's health care costs." Id. at 485.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 485 n.101 (quoting Maurin v. Hall, 682 N.W.2d 886, 892 app. (Wis. 2004)).
104. See id. at 485 nn.224-29.
105. Id. at 487.
106. Id. at 488.
107. Id. at 487.
108. Id. at 488 & nn. 235-37 (citing GAO studies).
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supported this conclusion as well.'0 9 Thus, the court concluded, the over-
all "evidence [did] not suggest that a $350,000 cap on noneconomic
damages is rationally related to the objective of ensuring quality health
care by preventing doctors from practicing defensive medicine ....
[E]vidence of the effects of defensive medicine was 'weak or inconclu-
sive. ' ' 1 10
e. Ferdon's Conclusion
Based on all of these grounds, the court declared: "To hold that a
rational basis exists for the $350,000 statutory cap on noneconomic dam-
ages in medical malpractice cases would amount to applying a judicial
rubber stamp to an unconstitutional statute. ' 11' While adhering "to the
concept of judicial restraint that cautions against substituting judicial
opinion for the will of the legislature," the court nevertheless concluded
"that the challengers have met their burden and have demonstrated that
the $350,000 cap ... is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."
'1 12
f A Contrasting View
In contrast, a number of states have upheld the constitutionality of
damages caps when faced with equal protection or other constitutional
challenges.11 3 For example, in Zdrojewski, the Michigan Court of Ap-
109. See id. at 489 nn.238-40.
110. Id. at 489 (citing CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABLITY FOR
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (Jan. 8, 2004)).
111. Id. at 491.
112. Id. Other state courts have similarly struck down damages caps. See, e.g., Moore v. Mo-
bile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 171 (Ala. 1991) (holding that limitation on noneconomic dam-
ages in medical malpractice action violated the equal protection and right to jury trial guarantees of
the Alabama State Constitution); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1089 (Il. 1997)
(holding that damages cap violated Illinois's constitutional prohibition on special legislation that
arbitrarily discriminates in favor of a select group and also violated the separation of powers doc-
trine); Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1236 (N.H. 1991) (holding that noneconomic damages
cap violated equal protection guarantee of the New Hampshire constitution); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) (holding that limitation on all medical malpractice damages violated
equal protection); Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 475 (Or. 1999) (holding that jury de-
termination of damages is a necessary part of the right to a jury trial).
113. See, e.g., Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 191 (Fla. 1993) (holding that none-
conomic damages cap in medical malpractice arbitration statute did not violate due process, equal
protection, the right to trial by jury, the takings clause, or nondelegation doctrines); Zdrojewski v.
Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721, 735-39 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a noneconomic damages cap
did not deny patient equal protection or the right to have damages determined by a jury and did not
violate separation of powers doctrine of the state constitution); Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp.,
832 S.W.2d 898, 901, 908 (Mo. 1992) (holding that damages caps did not infringe on plaintiff's
access to the courts, right to a jury trial, or right to equal protection and due process under the state
and federal constitutions); Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877, 887-88 (W. Va.
1991) (holding that statutory $1 million noneconomic damages cap did not violate plaintiffs' equal
protection or substantive due process rights or the right to certain remedy guaranteed by West Vir-
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peals determined that Michigan's damages cap did not violate the state
constitution's individual guarantees of equal protection and due process
of law.1 14 Applying rational basis review to the equal protection question,
the court held that the "statute at issue here is rationally related to a le-
gitimate governmental purpose."'1 5 The court noted that the "purpose of
the damages limitation was to control increases in health care costs by
reducing the liability of medical care providers, thereby reducing mal-
practice insurance premiums, a large component of health care costs.
' ' 16
Without analyzing the empirical data or considering whether the dam-
ages cap actually responded to the legislative concerns, the court con-
cluded: "Controlling health care costs is a legitimate governmental pur-
pose. By limiting at least one component of health care costs, the non-
economic damages limitation is rationally related to its intended pur-
pose."
1 17
2. The Right to Trial by Jury
State constitutions guarantee plaintiffs in civil suits the right to trial
by jury, which "includes the right to have damages determined by a
jury. ,1 8 Thus, challenges to damages caps may rest in part on the argu-
ment that statutory damages caps violate the right to trial by jury.11 9 The
Zdrojewski court also held that Michigan's damages cap did not violate
ginia's constitution); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 145 (Utah 2004) (holding that statutory cap on
quality-of-life damages did not violate open courts clause in state constitution, uniform operation of
laws provision in state constitution, plaintiffs right to due process and jury trial, or separation of
powers doctrine).
114. 657 N.W.2d at 737, 739. The statute limiting noneconomic damages provides, in part:
(1) In an action for damages alleging medical malpractice by or against a person or party,
the total amount of damages for noneconomic loss recoverable by all plaintiffs, resulting
from the negligence of all defendants, shall not exceed $280,000.00 unless, as the result
of the negligence of 1 or more of the defendants, 1 or more of the following exceptions
apply as determined by the court pursuant to section 6304, in which case damages for
noneconomic loss shall not exceed $500,000.00: (a) The plaintiff is hemiplegic, paraple-
gic, or quadriplegic resulting in a total permanent functional loss of I or more limbs
caused by I or more of the following: (i) Injury to the brain. (ii) Injury to the spinal cord.
(b) The plaintiff has permanently impaired cognitive capacity rendering him or her inca-
pable of making independent, responsible life decisions and permanently incapable of in-
dependently performing the activities of normal, daily living. (c) There has been perma-
nent loss of or damage to a reproductive organ resulting in the inability to procreate.
Id. at 736 n.7 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1483 (2000)).
115. Id. at 739.
116. Id.
117. Id. Although the plaintiff had not briefed the due process challenge to the damages cap,
the court noted that it would not invalidate the cap on that basis either, stating: "the tests for whether
legislation violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Michigan Constitution are
essentially the same." Id. at 737 n.12.
118. Id. at 736.
119. See id.
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the plaintiff's right to a jury trial. 120 Because the plaintiff was "able to try
this case in front of a jury that rendered a verdict," and because the
Michigan statute "prohibits the trial court from informing the jury of the
noneconomic damages limitation,"' 2' the court concluded that "the jury
rendered its damages award on the basis of the facts of the case, unaware
of the limitation of the statute.'
122
Similarly, in Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center,123 the
Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho's cap on noneconomic damages
1 24
did not violate the right to a jury trial as defined by the Idaho constitu-
tion. 1 25 The court reasoned that "the statute does not infringe upon the
jury's right to decide cases. The jury is still allowed to act as the fact
finder in personal injury cases. The statute simply limits the legal conse-
quences of the jury's finding." 126 As in Zdrojewski, the court relied on
the fact that "the jury is not instructed about the cap, and is free to make
all factual determinations relevant to the case. Once those factual deter-
minations have been made, it is then up to the judge to apply the law to
the facts as found by the jury."'127 The court did acknowledge that other
courts have concluded that this procedure "plays lip service to the form
of the jury but robs the institution of its function.' 28 However, the court
was not persuaded, concluding:
[T]he [plaintiffs] had a jury trial during which they were entitled
to present all of their claims and evidence to the jury and have
the jury render a verdict based on that evidence. That is all to
which the right to jury entitles them. The legal consequences and
effect of a jury's verdict are a matter for the legislature (by pass-
ing laws) and the courts (by applying those laws to the facts as
found by the jury).
129
120. Id. at 737.
121. Id.; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304(5) (West 2000) ("In an action alleging medical
malpractice, the court shall reduce an award of damages in excess of 1 of the limitations set forth in
section 1483 to the amount of the appropriate limitation set forth in section 1483. The jury shall not
be advised by the court or by counsel for either party of the limitations set forth in section 1483 or
any other provision of section 1483.").
122. Zdrojewski, 657 N.W.2d at 737.
123.4 P.3d 1115, 1120 (Idaho 2000).
124. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (1998).
125. IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 7.
126. Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1120 (citing Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va.
1989) (holding that a statute limiting damages awarded in medical malpractice actions did not vio-
late the plaintiffs right to a jury trial because, "although a party has the right to have a jury assess
his damages, he has no right to have a jury dictate through an award the legal consequences of its
assessment.")).
127. Id.
128. Id. (quoting Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 473 (Or. 1999)).
129. Id.
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B. Separation of Powers
The separation of powers doctrine mandates that each of the three
branches of government-legislative, executive, and judicial-remain
"entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of
either of the others." ' 30 Just as the U.S. Constitution protects the "three
coequal but separate branches of government, each with the ability to
exercise checks and balances on the two others,"'' state constitutions
also require that "[e]ach branch of government ha[ve] its own unique
sphere of authority that cannot be exercised by another branch.
1 32
Legislatively-imposed damages caps implicate the separation of
powers doctrine because caps arguably "contravene[] the traditional au-
thority of the courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether a jury's
damages award is excessive."1 33 "For over a century it has been a tradi-
tional and inherent power of the judicial branch of government to apply
the doctrine of remittitur, in appropriate and limited circumstances, to
correct excessive jury verdicts."1 34 In Best v. Taylor Machine Works, the
Illinois Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Illinois's
$500,000 damages cap "in all common law, statutory or other actions
that seek damages on account of death, bodily injury, or physical damage
to property based on negligence."1 35 The court held that the statutory cap
violated the state constitution's separation of powers doctrine, reasoning
that the legislative limit "undercut[] the power, and obligation, of the
judiciary to reduce excessive verdicts."'' 36 In the court's view, a legisla-
tively-imposed damages cap "functions as a 'legislative remittitur' . . .
[that] disregards the jury's careful deliberative process in determining
damages that will fairly compensate injured plaintiffs who have proven
their causes of action. The cap on damages is mandatory and operates
130. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).
131. Schindler ex rel. Schiavo v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1273 (Birch, J., concurring) (1 th
Cir. 2005).
132. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1078 (I11. 1997) (citing ILL. CONST. art. 11,
§ 1).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1079.
135. Id. at 1064, 1066 (quoting 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1 (West 1996)).
136. Id. at 1080. In addition to concluding that the legislatively-imposed damages cap violated
the separation of powers doctrine, the court held that the cap violated the special legislation clause of
the state constitution, id. at 1069, which provides: "The General Assembly shall pass no special or
local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made
applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination." ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (emphasis added).
Because a "special legislation challenge generally is judged under the same standards applicable to
an equal protection challenge," Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1070, the court's analysis of the special legisla-
tion challenge was similar to Ferdon's equal protection analysis. See id. at 1069-78. The Best court
did not consider the plaintiffs' other claims. See id. at 1081.
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wholly apart from the specific circumstances of a particular plaintiffs
noneconomic injuries."'' 37 Based on these conclusions, the court held that
the legislative cap "unduly encroache[d] upon the fundamentally judicial
prerogative of determining whether a jury's assessment of damages is
excessive within the meaning of the law."
'1 38
The Best court relied on a discussion of legislative remittitur con-
tained in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp. 139 In that case, the Washington Su-
preme Court held that Washington's statutory limit on noneconomic
damages, which limited damages recoverable in personal injury or
wrongful death actions, was unconstitutional.1 40 Although the Sofie
court's holding was ultimately based on the violation of the plaintiffs'
right to a trial by jury, the court also noted that the statutory damages cap
might violate the separation of powers doctrine.1 4 1 The court reasoned
that the damages cap might unconstitutionally operate as a "legislative
remittitur" because it "directly change[d] the outcome of a jury determi-
nation.., by taking a jury's finding of fact and altering it to conform to a
predetermined formula."'
142
In Best, the court agreed with the Washington Supreme Court's ob-
servation that:
[R]emittitur is wholly within the power of the trial judge, and it
is the judge who is empowered to make the legal conclusion, on
a case-by-case basis, that the jury's damage award is excessive
in light of the evidence. Consequently, because the '[1]egislature
cannot make such case-by-case determinations,' separation of
powers concerns would be violated by the 'legislative attempt to
mandate legal conclusions.' 143
Accordingly, the Best court noted that "courts are constitutionally
empowered, and indeed obligated, to reduce excessive verdicts where
appropriate in light of the evidence adduced in a particular case."' 144 Be-
cause the statutory cap "invade[d] the power of the judiciary to limit ex-
cessive awards of damages," the court held that the cap violated the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine. 1
45
137. Id. at 1080.
138. Id.
139. 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989).
140. Id. at 638, 77 P.2d at 713.
141. Id. at 654, 77 P.2d at 721.
142. See id. at 653, 77 P.2d 720.
143. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1080-81 (quoting Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 654, 771 P.2d at 721).
144. Id. at 1081.
145. Id.
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Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion, however.146 In
Judd v. Drezga, for example, the Utah Supreme Court upheld Utah's
$250,000 limit on noneconomic damages.1 47 In that case, the plaintiff
suffered severe brain damage at birth due to a physician's "incompetence
in his failed attempt to deliver [the plaintiff] with the use of forceps.,
148
The jury awarded the plaintiff damages for past expenses and $1,000,000
as "the amount necessary to maintain his life during his expected-
although shortened-life span." 149 The jury also awarded $1,250,000 in
noneconomic damages, which the court described as "damages in recog-
nition of the difference between a life as a normal, healthy boy, and a life
as he must now live it: severely brain damaged, with drastically reduced
life experiences and expectations."'1 50 The measure for these damages,
according to the court, is "the difference between what life would have
been like without the harm done by the medical professional, and what it
is like with that additional burden. In [the plaintiffs] case, the difference
[was] dramatic in terms of his abilities, his joys, his opportunities, and
his life expectancy."
1 51
Analyzing the plaintiffs constitutional challenges, including the ar-
gument that the damages cap violated the separation of powers doc-
trine, 52 the court considered the legislature's purpose in enacting the
cap:
The legislature imposed this cap because it was convinced that
doing so would limit malpractice insurance costs for medical
professionals, thereby helping to control excessively high medi-
cal care costs and health insurance premiums paid by most citi-
146. See, e.g., Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721, 735-39 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (hold-
ing that cap on noneconomic damages did not violate equal protection or the right to have damages
determined by a jury, and did not violate separation of powers doctrine of state constitution); Judd v.
Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 145 (Utah 2004) (holding that statutory cap on quality-of-life damages did not
violate open courts clause, uniform operation of laws provision, due process, right to a jury trial, or
separation of powers doctrine under the state constitution).
147. Judd, 103 P.3d at 141 (upholding UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (2002)). The statute
provides that "an injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffer-
ing, and inconvenience," UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1(1), and the limit may be adjusted for infla-
tion. Id. § 78-14-7.1(1)(a)-(c).
148. Judd, 103 P.3d at 137.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 138.
152. UTAH CONST. art. V, § 1. In addition to the separation of powers challenge, the plaintiff
argued that the cap violated the state constitution's open courts provision, id. art. 1, § 11, the uniform
operation of laws, id. art. 1, § 24, the guarantee of due process, id. art. 1, § 7, and the right to a jury
trial in civil cases, id. art. I, § 10. Judd, 103 P.3d at 138.
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zens and assuring a continued supply of medical care to all. This
was a policy choice made by the legislature, as is its duty.153
The court acknowledged that "the empirical truth of these findings
is a matter of some dispute," but did not analyze the empirical data. 154
The court deferred to the legislature and concluded: "The damage cap
represents law to be applied, not an improper usurpation of jury preroga-
tives. Consequently, it does not violate the separation of powers provi-
sion of the constitution."' 55
Comparing the above cases reveals that there are "clear disagree-
ments among the states regarding the constitutionality of statutory caps
on medical malpractice awards.' 56 Moreover, there is disagreement even
within the courts themselves. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed
in Ferdon: "Even in state courts in which caps have been declared consti-
tutional, there is invariably one or more strong dissents."1 57 A new
model, based on controls other than damages caps, will alleviate this un-
certainty and allow for a more consistent handling of medical malprac-
tice liability concerns.
58
153. Judd, 103 P.3d at 138.
154. ld. at 140.
155. Id. at 145.
156. Michael J. Cetra, Comment, Damage Control: Statutory Caps on Medical Malpractice
Claims, State Constitutional Challenges, and Texas Proposition 12, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 537, 550
(2004).
157. Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 448 (Wis. 2005).
158. This uncertainty may underlie, in part, President Bush's call for a uniform rule. See Presi-
dent George W. Bush, Address at the Gateway Center in Collinsville, supra note 24. While it is true,
"given the structure and limitations of federalism," that states have traditionally regulated health care
and are allowed "great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives,
limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons," Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904, 923 (2006),
Congress may nonetheless have the power under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3,
to enact federal regulation imposing damages caps. For a more complete discussion of whether Con-
gress has the power to enact federal damages caps, and whether Congress should do so, see Nim
Razook, A National Medical Malpractice Reform Act (and Why the Supreme Court may Prefer to
Avoid It), 28 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 99 (2003). Congress already has noted that "the increasing oc-
currence of medical malpractice and the need to improve the quality of medical care have become
nationwide problems that warrant greater efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual
State," 42 U.S.C. § 11101(1) (West, WESTLAW current through P.L. 109-240 approved 7-11-06).
In response to these problems, Congess established a national practitioner reporting system and data
bank. See Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (West, WESTLAW
current through P.L. 109-240 approved 7-11-06). The Health Care Quality Improvement Act, ad-
dressed below, may be a better way to respond to the concerns regarding medical malpractice and
the rising costs of health care. See infra Part V.D.
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IV. Do DAMAGE CAPS SOLVE THE PROBLEM
THEY ARE MEANT TO SOLVE?
Even if state or federal limitations are constitutionally permissible,
the important question is whether they achieve their intended goal of
keeping malpractice premiums low. As stated by the Ferdon court, "we
must test whether the legislative hypothesis that a $350,000 cap on non-
economic damages bears a rational relationship to malpractice insurance
premiums has a basis in reality.' 59 The empirical data simply does not
support this hypothesis. Recent studies suggest that there is "little or no
relationship between the level of malpractice insurance premiums and
the enactment of tort-reform measures such as damage caps, and state-
level tort reform does little to avert local physician shortages."'
160
Although California is often cited as the pioneer of medical mal-
practice reform because its decision to cap damages supposedly kept li-
ability insurance premiums from rising, 161 a close look at exactly what
happened in California reveals the fallacy of that supposition. Even as
the California Supreme Court held that the legislatively-imposed cap of
$250,000 was "rationally related to the objective of reducing the costs of
malpractice defendants and their insurers,"'162 the cap did nothing to con-
trol increasing medical malpractice premiums. 163 Indeed, after the pas-
sage of the California statute in 1975, "California's malpractice insur-
ance premiums continued to increase through 1988 to an 'all-time high'
that was 450% higher than in 1975. "164 It was only after California
passed insurance reform legislation in 1988 that the rise in insurance
premiums ceased.
165
Other states have had similar experiences. For example, as of 2005,
insurance rates in Texas had not come down despite the enactment of a
159. 701 N.W.2d at 468.
160. Tort Reform Has Little Effect on Med-Mal Insurance Rates, Study Finds, 12 Andrews
Med. Devices Litig. Reporter (West) No. 26, at 11 (Feb. 20, 2006); see also HUNTER & DOROSHOW,
supra note 18, at 1-2; Baicker & Chandra, supra note 2, at 31. See generally THOMAS 0.
MCGARITY, DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, & KAREN SOKOL, THE CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM,
WHITEPAPER NO. 509, THE TRUTH ABOUT TORTS: AN INSURANCE CRISIS, NOT A LAWSUIT CRISIS
(2005), available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/Torts_509.pdf
161. See Gregory, supra note 11, at 1036; see Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of
1975, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1975).
162. Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 680 (Cal. 1985).
163. See Gregory, supra note 11, at 1044-46.
164. Id. at 1039.
165. See id; see also Chris A. Messerly & Genevieve M. Warwick, Nowhere to Turn: A
Glance at the Facts Behind the Supposed Need for Tort "Reform," 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 489, 494
(2005) (stating that "Proposition 103 mandated that insurance companies immediately decrease rates
by 20 percent and prohibited any insurance company from imposing rate increases of greater than 15
percent without first holding a public hearing to explain the need for the substantial increase.");
MCGARITY, KYSAR, & SOKOL, supra note 160, at 8.
[Vol. 30:119
Controlling Costs of Medical Malpractice
noneconomic damages cap in 2003.166 Similarly, in Missouri, insurance
premiums hit "record highs in 2002 and 2003" even though Missouri has
had a cap on damages since 1986.167 Conversely, Minnesota has no dam-
ages caps but has had relatively low growth in premium rates and claims
payments.
168
The insurance industry itself has admitted that caps on non-
economic damages will not lead to lower premiums because these dam-
ages "make up such a small fraction of the amounts actually paid to
injured individuals." 169 An insurance industry study revealed that claims
account for a tiny portion of every dollar spent on health care, and mal-
practice premiums are due to many factors-not just the size of jury
awards.1 70 Indeed, according to the president and chief executive officer
of a leading insurance association, "the industry's problems were due to
price cuts taken 'to the point of absurdity' in the early 1980s.
'' 71
Empirical studies have also shown that caps do not affect the avail-
ability of physicians or the kind of medicine they practice.172 For exam-
ple, one such study, conducted by Katherine Baicker and Amitabh
Chandra, professors of economics at Dartmouth College and Harvard
University, respectively, examined data from the early 1990s through
2003.173 The Baicker study analyzed the claims of tort reform advocates
that physicians in states without caps will face increases in their malprac-
tice premiums, which will result in a decrease in a state's physician
population and an increase in the practice of "defensive" medicine by
those physicians who remain.
17 4
166. Messerly & Warwick, supra note 165, at 495.
167. McManus, supra note 31, at 897 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2000)).
168. Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 472 (Wis. 2005)
(citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS
OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 37 (2003)).
169. Messerly & Warwick, supra note 165, at 495. Presumably, the balance of the amounts
actually paid to injured individuals reflected their actual economic loss, which, as one court had
noted are "subject to careful calculation." Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 138 (Utah 2004).
170. Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 472 n.141 (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-
702, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED
PREMIUM RATES (2003)).
171. HUNTER & DOROSHOW, supra note 18, at 4 (quoting Maurice R. Greenwald, Insurers
Must Share Blame. AIG Head, BUS. INS., Mar. 31, 1986, at 3). To attract new customers, insurance
companies offer coverage at very low premium rates, which then prove to be very costly for the
insurers. See id. The insurers subsequently raise rates to existing customers that are not tied to their
claim history but rather to the insurers' previous rate decisions. See id.; see also Alison Lothes,
Comment, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settlements and Litigants' Economic
Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 467 n.152 (2005).
172. See sources cited supra note 165.
173. Baicker & Chandra, supra note 2, at 26.
174. Id. at 24.
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The study found "no relationship between the level of malpractice
premiums and the presence of traditional tort reform measures such as
damage caps."'175 Moreover, the researchers saw "very little effect" of
increased premiums "on the total number of physicians in each state.' 76
They did acknowledge, however, that older physicians and surgeons in
rural areas "may leave practice when premiums rise, but they comprise a
small enough subset of the physician population that overall size of the
physician workforce per capita does not seem to be affected."'
' 77
The Ferdon decision confirmed this finding. 78 The court noted that
between 1970 and 2000, states with caps and states without caps all saw
an increase in the number of physicians, and, even though Wisconsin had
a cap on noneconomic damages for approximately half of that time, it
"had a smaller increase than seven states without [them].", 7 9 Based on
this evidence, the court concluded that "health care providers do not de-
cide to practice in a particular state based on the state's cap on non-
economic damages."'
' 80
The Baicker study also confirmed that the existence of caps does
not protect against the practice of defensive medicine. It compared the
level of spending in states with and without caps and found no correla-
tion between spending and caps.' 8' Although the researchers noted that
increasing malpractice liability pressures do seem to increase expendi-
tures on diagnostic procedures, they found "little evidence that malprac-
tice payments are driving the dramatic increase in overall health care
expenditures."'' 82 Similarly, although the Ferdon court acknowledged
that "[t]here is anecdotal support for the assertion that doctors practice
defensive medicine," the court concluded that "an 'accurate measure-
ment of the extent of this phenomenon is virtually impossible."
83
As the empirical evidence indicates, it is not easy to determine the
extent to which physicians practice defensive medicine or whether cap-
ping their liability would encourage them not to do so. There can be no
debate, however, that a myriad of factors affect medical malpractice in-
175. Id. at 31.
176. Id. at 29.
177. Id.
178. See Ferdon ex reL Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 485-87 (Wis.
2005).
179. Id. at 486 n.227.
180. Id. at 487.
181. Baicker & Chandra, supra note 2, at 29.
182. Id. at 31.
183. Id. at 487-88 (quoting U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 3-4 (1994), available at http://www.wws.
princeton.edu/ota).
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surance premiums, as well as why physicians practice where they do,
what specialties they choose, and what tests they order.1
84
The empirical evidence suggests that the answer to rising medical
malpractice premiums is not simply capping the size of jury verdicts.
Premiums are tied to various factors, including "state premium rate regu-
lation, level of competition among insurers, and interest rates and income
returns that affect insurers' investment returns. 185 Moreover, jury ver-
dicts, in most cases, do not even reach the statutory caps, except in those
lawsuits involving "severe injuries, such as quadriplegia or severe brain
damage, with terminal diagnosis or the need for lifetime care. ' 186 Fur-
thermore, "if it is true, as the legislature has determined, that a health
care 'crisis' exists, the burden of remedying that crisis should not be
placed solely upon the shoulders of malpractice victims. Rather, it more
appropriately should fall upon those causing the crisis-the negligent
health care providers."'
87
v. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Market forces should be the starting point for improving health care
and reducing claims and liability for those claims. Regulation of insur-
ance rate increases, litigation practices, health care professional peer re-
view procedures, and public access to peer review information will sup-
plement improvements in the quality of care and achieve better health
care at lower cost.
A. Regulate Insurance Rates and Litigation Practices
One way to reduce medical malpractice liability premiums is to do
what the California legislature did: impose restrictions on insurance
companies' ability to raise rates. 188 Another way to keep costs down is to
184. Elizabeth Stewart Poisson, Comment, Addressing the Impropriety of Statutory Caps on
Pain and Suffering Awards in the Medical Liability System, 82 N.C. L. REv. 759, 767-70 (2004).
185. Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 472 (Wis. 2005)
(quoting U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE (2003)); accord James L. Wright
& M. Matthew Williams, Remember the Alamo: The Seventh Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution, the Doctrine of Incorporation, and State Caps on Jury Awards, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 449,
461-64 (2004).
186. McManus, supra note 31, at 898. In Missouri, for example, only five cases ended with
jury verdicts above the state's $557,000 cap. Id. "[T]he average non-economic damage award was
only $85,140, and the median or typical award was even lower, $27,872, only five percent of the cap
amount." Id.
187. Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058, 1067-68 (Kan. 1987).
188. See Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West
1975); Gregory, supra note II, at 1039. California's insurance reform legislation is discussed supra,
note 165.
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control the filing of frivolous lawsuits, which some states accomplish by
requiring that plaintiffs secure medical expert support for their claims
prior to filing suit. 189 For example, South Carolina's recently enacted tort
reform legislation requires a plaintiff to file an affidavit of an expert wit-
ness along with a notice of intent to file suit before actually filing a
medical malpractice complaint. 190 Similarly, Mississippi requires a com-
plaint alleging medical malpractice to be accompanied by an affidavit by
the attorney filing the complaint that verifies that the attorney has re-
viewed the facts of the case, has consulted a qualified expert, and "has
concluded on the basis of such review and consultation that there is a
reasonable basis for the commencement of such action."
19'
B. Improve the Quality of Care
Another way to reduce liability costs and premiums is to reduce
mistakes and make doctors who commit mistakes pay for them. Cur-
rently, all doctors in the same specialty pay the same rates regardless of
their performance, 92 which is not consistent with other areas of business.
This system could be changed legislatively or perhaps voluntarily by in-
surers. A less dramatic change, however, would be an improvement in
care. As one study concluded, "one of the surest ways to 'deal with the
problem of increasing insurance costs' is to eliminate the conditions that
result in acts amounting to medical malpractice." '1 93 Capping damages
will not solve the problem, and it is "counterproductive" to "reduce or
eliminate malpractice verdicts" in those cases where mistakes are made
and people are injured.'
94
A look at the improvements made by anesthesiologists and the im-
pact those improvements have had on liability premiums suggests that
the appropriate starting point for controlling costs is to deliver a better
189. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682 (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-58 (West
Supp. 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125 (West Supp. 2005).
190. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125 (West Supp. 2005).
191. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-58 (West Supp. 2005); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682
(West 2005) (requiring plaintiffs attorney to file an affidavit with the complaint which declares that:
the facts of the case have been reviewed by the plaintiffs attorney with an expert whose
qualifications provide a reasonable expectation that the expert's opinions could be admis-
sible at trial and that, in the opinion of this expert, one or more defendants deviated from
the applicable standard of care and by that action caused injury to the plaintiff).
192. Lothes, supra note 171, at 467 n. 152.
193. Ferdon ex reL Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 464 n.1 10 (Wis.
2005) (quoting U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HRD-87-73, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 3 (1987)).
194. Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058, 1067 (Kan. 1987) (considering Kansas's abrogation of
the collateral source rule, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3403 (repealed 1988)).
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product.195 Anesthesiology has undeniable risks; indeed, it is one of the
more risk-prone specialties in medicine. 96 After studying their own prac-
tices and analyzing the causes of patient deaths, anesthesiologists made
great improvements in the way they administer anesthesia and monitor
their patients, which has led to a dramatic decrease in the number of pa-
tient deaths.
197
In the early 1980s, ABC News aired a program exposing the huge
number of deaths caused by anesthesiologists.198 At around the same
time, anesthesiologists were facing the second increase in medical mal-
practice premiums in ten years. 199 Premium rates for anesthesiologists at
that time were two to three times higher than premium rates paid by doc-
tors in other specialties. 200 The anesthesiologists were anxious to do
something to address this problem.201 With $100,000 of its own money,
the American Society of Anesthesiologists created the Anesthesia Patient
Safety Foundation to address patient safety. 2  The Foundation, com-
prised of doctors, nurses, insurers, and manufacturers of products used
by anesthesiologists, reviewed information obtained from insurers on
closed malpractice claims in an effort to understand why anesthesia
caused death or injury to so many patients. 20 3 The information the Foun-
dation collected led to the development of new instruments and proce-
dures that could virtually eliminate death or injury from the most com-
mon errors made during the administration of anesthesia.
20 4
195. See Joseph T. Hallinan, Heal Thyself: Once Seen as Risky, One Group Of Doctors
Changes its Ways, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2005, at Al.
196. Id.
197. Id. Patient deaths due to anesthesia have declined from one in every 5,000 patients to one




201. Id. When interviewed by the Wall Street Journal, Ellison C. Pierce Jr., a retired professor
of anesthesiology at Harvard Medical School, who is considered by many to be the father of the
safety movement within anesthesiology, was quoted as describing the anesthesiologists as "terrified"
and anxious to do something. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company was the first insurer to allow the Founda-
tion to review the claims. Id. Other insurers were hesitant to allow the Foundation access to their
files because of confidentiality concerns. Id. Once St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company al-
lowed access, however, other insurers did the same. Id.
204. Id. These instruments measured the oxygen level in a patient's blood stream and the car-
bon dioxide level in a patient's expelled breath to monitor whether the patient was breathing prop-
erly. Id. The Foundation urged the widespread use of these instruments, despite their cost, which led
to the inclusion of the tools as part of basic anesthesia care. Id. To keep a patient warm during sur-
gery, which the Foundation's research also identified as a cause of injury and death, anesthesiolo-
gists made simple changes such as using heated blankets and blood-and-fluid warmers to keep a
patient's body temperature at a safe level. Id.
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The adoption of these new instruments and procedures led to a
dramatic drop in patient injury and death.2 °5 With that drop, the number
of malpractice suits against anesthesiologists also dropped.2 °6 The size of
payments for malpractice claims declined as well, and claims for serious
injuries decreased.07 With the drop in the number of those injured and
killed and the decrease in the number of malpractice suits and payouts,
there was a corresponding decrease in malpractice insurance rates. 20 8 Af-
ter adjusting for inflation, malpractice rates for anesthesiologists have
fallen thirty-seven percent over the last twenty years.
209
Anesthesiologists were the first group of doctors to study patient
safety and make real strides in improving patient care, 210 and the ramifi-
cations of these changes and the related decrease in insurance premiums
are far-reaching. Other groups of physicians have taken note and are be-
ginning self-studies of their own.21 For example, the College of Sur-
geons has begun a closed-claims study, just as the anesthesiologists did,
and has begun making changes in surgical procedures.2t 2 Already, the
College has seen a connection between improving patient safety and
205. Id.
206. PUBLIC CITIZEN, ANESTHESIOLOGISTS' EXPERIENCE SHOWS PATIENT SAFETY EFFORTS
DO MORE THAN DAMAGE CAPS TO REDUCE LAWSUITS AND INSURANCE PREMIUMS (Feb. 18, 2004),
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Anesthesiologists.pdf. According to the study, after
the introduction of these safety procedures and instruments, claims against anesthesiologists ac-
counted for only 3.8% of claims against all doctors, which was consistent with the percentage of
anesthesiologists as compared with all other doctors. Id. Prior to these improvements, claims against
anesthesiologists accounted for 7.9% of all medical malpractice claims, which was double the pro-
portion of anesthesiologists to the rest of the physician population. Id.
207. Hallinan, supra note 195.
208. Id.
209. Id. See also Ross Eisenbrey, Malpractice Made Perfect, THE AM. PROSPECT ONLINE,
Aug. 2, 2005, http://www.prospect.org/web/view-web.ww?id=10058, stating:
As the standard of care improved, medical errors, malpractice, and malpractice litigation
have all declined. Anesthesiologists have cut their share of all malpractice claims in half,
and the share of claims involving serious injury has also fallen. In the 1970s, more than
half involved death or permanent brain injury; today, it is less than one-third. The effect
on insurance premiums is another cause for celebration. As malpractice premiums for
every other specialty have skyrocketed over the last two decades, they have fallen 37 per-
cent for anesthesiologists, to an average of $22,572 per year.
In 2002, insurance premiums for anesthesiologists were at their lowest since 1985. Since then, even
anesthesiologists have seen an increase in their premiums, despite their consistent improvement in
care. This supports the claim by many that malpractice premium rates are actually not related to
actual payouts in malpractice litigation, but are connected instead to the insurers' overall economic
picture. Karen B. Domino, Another Malpractice Insurance Crisis Brewing for Anesthesiologists?,
ASA NEWSLETTER (Am. Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, Park Ridge, Il.), June 2002.
210. John A. Ulatowski, Peter J. Pronovost, MD., Ph.D.: Recipient of the 2003 Presidential
Scholar Award, 100 ANESTHESIOLOGY, 216-17 (2004).
211. Hallinan, supra note 195.
212. Id.
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lowering malpractice premium rates. 21 3 Similarly, Peter J. Pronovost,
M.D., PhD., has studied medical practices in intensive care units and
their relation to patient outcomes.2' 1 4 His research has led to dramatic
changes in clinical practice worldwide.
21 5
C. Define Standards of Performance
In addition to improving care, the health care profession is focusing
on defining standards of performance and holding physicians account-
able when those standards are not met. The AMA recently agreed with
Congress to develop approximately 140 standards that will measure the
performance of physicians across a wide variety of practice areas.2 16
Prompted by a concern over Medicare costs, the Chairman of the AMA
and three Republican members of Congress have called for the develop-
ment of these standards by the end of 2006 to determine "whether doc-
tors follow best practices in treating patients. 2 17 When met, these "best
practices" are intended to lead to more efficient care which, according to
the supporters of the plan, should be rewarded with Medicare compensa-
tion.21 8 As stated by a representative of the American Association of Re-
tired Persons (AARP), "rewarding quality can improve results. 2 19
220Many physicians, however, are skeptical of the plan. It was de-
veloped and announced with little or no input from the physicians them-
selves. 221 Physicians from many specialties agree that standards of care
must be defined, but disagree with the aggressive timetable set for devel-
oping those standards and fear that the plan will "become just a smoke
screen to cut costs and to reduce the resources devoted to health care."
222
Emergency room doctors, orthopedic surgeons, neurosurgeons, and gy-
necologists all agree that standards are necessary and are developing
their own standards of performance. 23 They insist, however, that each
specialty area has unique concerns and should develop its own stan-
213. Id.
214. Ulatowski, supra note 210, at 217.
215. Id.
216. Robert Pear, A.MA to Develop Measure of Quality of Medical Care, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2006, at A 12.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. (quoting Thomas Thames, AARP board member).
220. Id.
221. Id. According to a letter written by seven medical specialty groups to the chair of the
AMA, "The A.M.A. acknowledged the existence of this agreement only after we uncovered it." Id.
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dards. 224 However such standards are developed, they will be a helpful
tool to improve patient care.
D. Report Mistakes
Another useful tool for improving the quality of care is the report-
ing system established by Congress pursuant to the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act (HCQIA).225 Acknowledging that "[t]here is a national
need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from State
to State without disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous dam-
aging or incompetent performance, 226 Congress "established a national
reporting system which, among other things, requires hospitals to pro-
vide information about adverse professional review actions and provides
immunity from damages for persons participating in peer review if cer-
tain standards are satisfied., 227 Health care entities are required to report
any adverse actions taken against a physician to a national practitioner
data bank.228 This data is available only to health care entities and not to
the public.229
Under the Act, any entity that "makes payment under a policy of
insurance, self-insurance, or otherwise in settlement (or partial settle-
ment) of, or in satisfaction of a judgment in, a medical malpractice action
or claim shall report [to the Secretary of Health and Human Services]
information respecting the payment and circumstances thereof., 230 In
addition, "[e]ach Board of Medical Examiners which revokes or sus-
pends (or otherwise restricts) a physician's license or censures, repri-
mands, or places on probation a physician, for reasons relating to the
physician's professional competence or professional conduct, or to which
a physician's license is surrendered, shall report" the information to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services or a designated agency.231
The regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act created the Na-
tional Practitioner Data Bank, which collects and maintains the reported
information.232 Health care entities, including hospitals, health mainte-
224. Id.
225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (West, WESTLAW current through P.L. 109-240 approved 7-
11-06).
226. Id. §11101(2).
227. Freilich v. Bd. of Dirs. of Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 679, 695 (D.
Md. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 11133, 11111-11112) (internal citations omitted).
228.42 U.S.C. § 11133 (West, WESTLAW current through P.L. 109-240 approved 7-11-06).
229. Id. § 11137(a); accord Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Mottola, 320 F. Supp. 2d 254, 259 (D. N.J.
2004).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a) (West, WESTLAW current through P.L. 109-240 approved 7-11-
06) (referencing id. § 11134).
231. Id. § 11132(1).
232. The National Practitioner Data Bank, 45 C.F.R. § 60.1 (2006).
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nance organizations, and group medical practices are required to report
to the National Practitioner Data Bank when they
adversely affect[] the clinical privileges of a physician for a period
longer than 30 days; accept[] the surrender of clinical privileges of a
physician while the physician is under an investigation by the entity
relating to possible incompetence or improper professional conduct,
or in return for not conducting such an investigation or proceeding;
or in the case of such an entity which is a professional society,
take[] a professional review action which adversely affects the
membership of a physician in the society.
233
HCQIA requires hospitals to request information from the National
Practitioner Data Bank whenever "a physician or licensed health care
practitioner applies to be on the medical staff (courtesy or otherwise) of,
or for clinical privileges at, the hospital. ' 34 With this, Congress intended
to "restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from State to
State without disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous damag-
,,235ing or incompetent performance. Hospitals are also required to obtain
information every two years regarding physicians or practitioners who
are currently on the medical staff or who have been granted clinical
privileges at the hospital.236
A cornerstone of the statutory scheme, necessary to discover inci-
dents of incompetent treatment and care, is the protection of physicians
who reveal the problems. HCQIA provides a broad grant of immunity for
those physicians who testify against their peers.237 The Act presumes that
the promise of immunity will encourage physicians to reveal a col-
league's incompetence. 238 Although one factor that discourages doctors
from reporting on others may be the perception that it is unprofessional
to do so, a more compelling concern for these individuals is that that they
may become liable for reporting information, even if it is truthful.23 9 By
ensuring immunity, Congress intended "to provide incentive and protec-
tion for physicians engaging in effective professional peer review. 24°
This statutory scheme has been criticized by physicians who have
been the subject of performance inquiries. Those physicians who believe
their careers have been severely limited and even destroyed in the course
233. 42 U.S.C. § 11133(1) (West, WESTLAW current through P.L. 109-240 approved 7-11-
06).
234. Id. § 11 135(a)(1).
235. Id. § I1101(2); accordid § 11135(a)(1).
236. Id. § 11 135(a)(2).
237. Id. § 1111 (a)(2).
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of the peer review process believe that, without the fear of being held
accountable for their statements, some physicians may report their com-
petitors "to achieve economic or power-driven gains.",24 1 Thus, some
commentators argue that the peer review laws have the "unanticipated
effect" of "promoting bad faith peer review." 242 The Act purportedly al-
lows one doctor to ruin another's career regardless of whether the testi-
mony offered is truthful or not.243 These allegations serve as a reminder
that, although members of the medical profession "more so than any
other profession, depend on the integrity of ... members to maintain an
exceptionally high level of care and mutual trust with their patients,"2 4
they may, in some instances, lack integrity and/or trust for one another.
HCQIA addresses these concerns, however, by refusing to provide im-
munity to informers who knowingly provide false testimony.245
While encouraging honest reporting and protecting those whom en-
gage in peer review are important objectives, HCQIA unduly restricts
public access to information concerning disciplinary actions against neg-
ligent physicians. The Act promises confidentiality to all individuals who
246participate in the peer review process. Information concerning adverse
actions may be released to hospitals and other health care facilities when
such information is requested as part of a hiring or retention process, but
this information cannot be released to the public. 247 If the quality of
241. Yann H.H. van Geertruyden, Comment, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: How the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 and State Peer Review Protection Statutes Have
Helped Protect Bad Faith Peer Review in the Medical Community, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 239, 252 (2001).
242. See, e.g., id. at 241.
243. See Verner S. Waite, Sham Peer Review: Napoleonic Law in Medicine, J. AM.
PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS, Fall 2003, at 84.
244. Geertruyden, supra note 241, at 240.
245. See 42 U.S.C. § 1111 (a)(2) (West, WESTLAW current through P.L. 109-240 approved
7-11-06).
246. Seeid. § 11137(b).
247. Id.; see also Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Mottola, 320 F. Supp. 2d 254, 259 (D. N.J. 2004). This
may be contrasted with states that require reporting of attorney misconduct. See ALASKA RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); ARK. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005);
COLO. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); DEL. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); IND. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); Mo. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); NEv. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 202 (2005); N.J. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); N.H.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-803 (2005);
OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); PA. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
8.3 (2005); R.I. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); S.C. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); S.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005); WYO. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2005). Many states allow public access to attorney disciplinary records, either by
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health care is to be fully promoted, however, it is important to provide
patients with relevant information about the performance of a physician
they may choose. The identities of testifying physicians can be protected
from public disclosure, but disciplinary action taken against particular
physicians should be available for public review. Only with full disclo-
sure can the public make educated decisions about which health care
providers to choose.
VI. CONCLUSION
Logic, experience, and current empirical data suggest that legisla-
tively-imposed damages caps for victims of medical malpractice will not
solve the problem of increasing insurance premium rates. A better legis-
lative response would be to restrict insurance rate increases, protect
against frivolous lawsuits by requiring pre-filing confirmation of the
merits of a claim, and ensure public access to information relevant to
choosing a competent physician. Most importantly, however, the health
care industry itself should continue improving the quality of care and
should be prepared to review and learn from mistakes made by members
of the health care profession.
specific request to a state regulatory board or by visiting a website. In Michigan, for example, the
public may request information from or access a website maintained by the Michigan Attorney Dis-
cipline Board. See Attorney Discipline Board, State of Michigan, http://www.adbmich.org/ (last
visited July 30, 2006). See also New Jersey Judiciary, njcourtonline.com, http://www.judiciary.
state.nj.us/oae/discipline.htm (last visited July 30, 2006) (public access to disciplinary records of
New Jersey attorneys); District of Columbia Bar, http://www.dcbar.org/for-lawyers/ethics/
discipline/disciplineOl.cfm (last visited July 30, 2006) (public access to disciplinary records of attor-
neys in the District of Columbia).
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